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An "incentive subsidy" policy for sUbsidizing private R & D is proposed that can be more efficient, from a social point of view, than subsidy policies in common use such as a "normal" subsidy policy (fixed amount CJranted at project start), and conditionaI loans (loan ~s repa id only if project is profitable).
The incentive subsidy compensates firms for any private loss and taxes away any gaini in addition the firm receives a small fraction of the resulting invention' s social value.
This mechanism comes close to being perfectly incentive compatible.
The firm chooses itself whether it wants to be covered under the incentive subsidy. Generally, the firm's choice coincides with three social aims:
First, a project that the firm would conduct in any case should not be subsidized.
Second, a project should not be subsidized if its social value is negative.
Third, the subsidy should provide an incentive to maximixe a project's social value.
Using a simulation over a range of hrpothetical research projects it is shown that the eff~ciency of conditionaI loans and normal grants declines drastically as the government's information about project parameters becomes poorer, while the incentive subsidy performs consistently weIl.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most governments spend rather large sums in support of private firms' innovation efforts. These funds are distributed in a variety of ways, most commonlyas project grants, subsidized or conditional loans, or in the form of general subsidies such as tax credits. In this paper a subsidy scheme is propos ed that seems to ful fil the government's aims better than most policies in current use.
This is shown theoretically and in a simulation over a range of hypothetical projects.
Governments intervene with innovation subsidies because some research is neglected by firms even though it has a positive social value. A firm may be too risk avers e to conduct a project that it would otherwise undertake; or an invention may have a larger social value when it diffuses so the firm cannot capture all of it. Such a positive externality may make it unprofitable for the firm to research even though it ought to from a social point of view.
Rather than subsidize all research to alleviate these market failures the government can save public funds by supporting only projects that are social ly valuable and that firms would not conduct of own initiative. Thus the government agencies employed to dole out subsidies face three major problems: First, they must identify research projects that are social ly worthwhile. Second, they should avoid subsidizing projects that the firm would conduct even without the subsidy. Third, the firm must have an incentive to conduct this research efficiently, using all opportunities for cost reduction and improvement of the prospective invention that arise.
The subsidy pOlicies in common use of ten fall far short of fulfilling these three criteria. In a previous paper (Fölster, 1987) Since the firm is rewarded for maximizing the social value it conducts the project efficiently, minimizing costs 7 and maximizing the social value of the innovation.
When a project has positive private return, so that R > O, then the firm usually looses by applying to the subsidy system because the private return will be taxed away. However there is a special case, as mentioned above, where the incentive subsidy is not perfectly incentive compatible. The firm will lie about some projects it would have researched even without the subsidy, and will receive funding for them. If the firm is risk neutral this occurs for projects that have an expected unsubsidized private It follows that the social ly R is larger or equal to the privately optimal w .
Further it is assumed that there are non-convexities in the industry research production set. This means that some research projects may be conducted in a social ly optimal way even without a subsidy. If this were not the case then the best policy could be merely to reimburse all firms for the difference between social and private values. The nonconvexity however means that the government may save public funds by selectively subsidizing only projects that firms would not conduct otherwise (this argument is formally in Fölster, 1987) . Here r is the opportun ity cost of raising
The constraints exist to ensure that the firm will research under the subsidy scheme and to ensure that it maximizes social value. Taking the derivative shows that the parameter a is then set as small as possible to just fulfil the constraints: This shows that as long as the government makes no systematic error, so that the error's expected value is zero, firms will set w to its social ly optimal level regardless of the choice of a -provided that the constraints in (7) The first principle is that a subsidy is more effective if the decision to subsidize is based on more accurate information. This shows why the incentive subsidy and the conditionaI loan outperform the normal subsidy.
with a normal subsidy the government evaluates a project ex-ante. Then it signs a check with few strings attached.
Information that emerges ex-post -but that the firm may have secretely known all along -is ignored.
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The conditionaI loan is more refined. Since the government uses the ex-post information, available under the conditionaI loan scheme, only when this is expected to raise social value, the conditionaI loan will always be a better policy too l when the ex-post information is better than ex-ante information.
Similarly the incentive subsidy can be made to grant exactly the same sums to firms as the normal subsidy by neglecting ex-post information and setting the parameter a to zero.
The normal subsidy has two further problems apart from using ex-ante information. First, it does not reward increases in social value. Second, it does not reduce the risk to firms as much as the conditionaI loan and the incentive subsidy. Both of the latter pay out larger sums when the project fails than when it succeeds. Since a risk averse firm values a unit subsidy more in the event that it is making a loss than when it is making a profit the same expected value of a subsidy raises utility less with the normal subsidy. This also means that one can get the firm to research, by raising its expected utility above zero, with a lower level of expected government handouts under the conditionaI loan and incentive subsidy. Since government handouts have an opportun ity cost it follows that a lower government expenditure is a definite 10 advantage.
Comparing the conditionai loan with the incentive subsidy is slightly more complicated.
The main problem with the conditionai loan is that one cannot tax the firm if the project turns out to be privately profitable. As a result firms will apply for the loan even with projects that they would conduct anyhow, but that have a chance of returning a private loss. Another problem is the fact that the conditionai loan does not reward improvements in social value.
The incentive subsidy can always be made to perform at least as weIl as the conditionai loan. This is apparent from the fact that the exact size of the incentive subsidy can be adjusted to any desired amount based on all available ex-post information about the private and social return. When granting a conditionai loan on the other hand the size of the potential subsidy must be determined based only on ex-ante information. Ex-post information can be used only in a very restricted way to determine how much of the loan should be repaid. One can never ask the firm to repay more than it received in the first place. This means that the incentive subsidy can be set at exactly the same level as the conditionai loan if the government gives up some of its freedom to act upon ex-post information.
Assuming that the government only uses the greater freedom with the incentive subsidy when this is expected to raise social value, it follows that the incentive subsidy is better.
More precisely, the incentive subsidy has the following advantages. It is argued that the incentive subsidy is a better policy than either the normal subsidy policy or the conditional loan that are commonly used in many countries.
Theoretical arguments lead to the conclusion that the conditional loan is a better policy than grants and that the incentive subsidy is a than the conditional loan. It is assumed that public funds have an opportun ity cost of 10%.
The projects themselves have a value that contains a constant component T, and a component t ln(w) that the firm determines itself by choosing an effort w. In addition there is arandom component o that has a 50% chance of being added or subtracted. The expected social value of a project is then:
The social value of a project is higher than its private value, due the parameter s, that is set equal to 0.7 here.4
So the private expected value is u (2) R = T + t ln(w + 1) -w + 0.5 o -0.5 o p Maximizing with respect to w gives an optimal private w = t -l and an optimal social w$ = t(l + s) -1.
In the simulation T increases in increments of 1 from -15 to 14 thus creating 30 projects. t is set to 4 and o to 10.
To account for risk aversion the form for constant absolute risk aversion is used: U = l/q(l -exp(-q X». q is set to 0.13 and X is the actual firm return.
with perfect government information the subsidies are calculated as follows:
1.
Hypothetical perfectly incentive compatible subsidy:
This is the amount required to compensate firms for researching in a socially optimal way, assuming that there are no incentive problems. Thus if R U is negative then g = -RV + (wS -wp') and if RV is positive then g = w 5 -w p • 2. Incentive subsidy: the parameter a is set to 5%. When the government does not have perfect information, then it makes mistakes in estimating the project parameter o.
The error e is assumed to follow a binary distribution so that o is estimated at (o + e) or (o -e), each with a 50% chance. e is set at the levels 3 and 8. The policies are then set as follows:
1.
Incentive subsidy:
The private return and the social value are estimated with an error. The optimal policy is just as in the perfect information case.
2.
Normal subsidy:
The social and private values are estimated with an error, leading to mi stakes in deciding what the level of subsidy should be.
The optimal subsidy turns out to be 0.6 times the perfect information subsidy when e = 3, and O when e = 8.
3.
Conditional loan:
The social and private values are estimated with an error, leading to mi stakes in deciding what the level of the loan should be and how much should be repaid.
The optimal loan turns out to be 0.8 times the perfect information loan when e = 3, and 0.7 times the perfect information case when e = 8.
When the government commits srstematic errors, e.g. consistently overestimating the soc1al value, the subsidies are calculated as in the perfect information case above. The only difference is that now the government's estimate of social value is taken to be twice the true social value. Another problem is that it is tempting for government officials to avoid subsidizing risky private projects that may fail and expose the government official to criticisms of lack of judgement.
This may result in a bias toward technically safe projects.
Unfortunately, it is exactly these projects that the firm is most likely to conduct of own accord.
Thus this bias leads to more cases where the subsidy has been wasted.
2.
The empirical literature has been summarized e.g. in Pavitt (1976) and Fölster (1986) .
Examples of studies are Gronhaug and Frederiksen (1984) and Mansfield (1984) .
3.
Specifically it was shown in Fölster (1987) that if the government has no ex-ante information about research projects except what it is told by firms (but perfect expost information), then a subsidr function cannot be devised that en sures that the follow1ng two conditions are met for anr project that firms can apply with:
First, no project w1th a negative social value or a positive private value is subsidized.
Second, a firm researches in away that maximizes social value.
4.
The claim is sometimes made that it is virtually impossible to value many inventions.
As a counterargument one need look no further than the stockmarket where venture ca~ital firms with risky research projects are valued by pr1vate agents all the time.
So the real question is not whether these values can be estimated, but rather how seriously mistakes in this valuation damage the efficiency of the policy.
5.
Advance loans become necessary only when capital markets do not function perfectlr. This may be the case in practice.
Correcting imperfect10ns in the capital market should be treated as a separate problem however, requiring a separate remedy.
The incentive subsidyas such solves only one market failure.
Amending the incentive subsidy with loans ameliorates a different market failure and is therefore not further considered here.
6.
The social value can be calculated by following a set of rules of thumb.
The firm may know these rules in advance, but it will not know how the government judges specific values until the project has been concluded. In practice it may be debatable when exactly a project is concluded.
It is hard to believe however that this constitutes a major problem.
7.
Since the incentive subsidy rewards a firm for increases in social value it may also be used to increase the rate of diffusion of a technology.
For example if the firm can show that it has hel~ed other firms to use its invention as weIl then the est1mated social value will be greater and the firm will earn a greater return.
8. Empirical studies tend to find that social returns to inventions are much larger than private returns, e.g.
9.
For example STU, the main government agency dispensing research subsidies in Sweden, grants a considerable fraction of its budget in the form of conditional loans.
Of these subs~dies roughly 25% are repa id (STU, 1983) .
10.
Public funds have a higher o~portunity cost than the firm's funds be cause they cons~st of the private opportunity costs of whoever they were taxed from as well as the deadweight loss of taxation.
For estimates of the opportunity cost of public funds see for example Hansson (1984 
